Pragmatists generally hold that the worth of an idea should be measured by its utility or efficacy in coping with a given problem, not by its correspondence to some antecedent 'Truth' or reality. Rorty combines pragmatism with a Wittgensteinian ontology that declares that meaning is a social-linguistic product, and sentences do not 'link up' with the world in a correspondence relation, a framework that allows him to question many of philosophy's most basic assumptions.

Major works
In his magnum opus, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), Rorty combines theoretical groundwork from Wilfred Sellars, Thomas Kuhn, Gilbert Ryle, Ludwig Wittgenstein and others to practice the doctrine of "dissolving" rather than solving philosophical problems. He argues that epistemology, the study of knowledge, is in fact the product of the mistaken view that the mind is a glassy essence, of which the main function is to faithfully reproduce external reality.

Rorty's other major work, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, was published in 1989. In it, Rorty abandons the attempt to explain his theories in analytic terms and creates an alternative conceptual schema to that of the "Platonists" he rejects. This schema is based on the belief that there is no 'truth' higher than the human being's ability to recreate her/himself, a view that has been adapted from Nietzsche and which Rorty also identifies with the novels of Proust and Henry James. This book also marks his first attempt to consciously articulate a political vision consonant with his philosophy, the vision of a diverse community bound together by opposition to suffering, and not by abstract ideas such as 'justice', 'common humanity', etc.

Later Work
In the early 1990s, Rorty became interested in philosophers in the continental philosophical tradition, such as Martin Heidegger, Søren Kierkegaard, Michael Foucault, and Jacques Derrida. His works include Essays on Heidegger and Others: Philosophical Papers (1991) and Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers (1998). These works attempt to the bridge the gap between analytic and continental philosophies by claiming the two traditions complement, rather than oppose each other.

“Analytic philosophy may not have lived up to its pretensions, and may not have solved the puzzles it thought it had. Yet in the process of finding reasons for putting those pretensions and those puzzles aside it helped earn itself an important place in the history of ideas. By giving up on the quest for apodicticity and finality that Husserl shared with Carnap and Russell, and by finding new reasons for thinking that that quest will never succeed, it cleared a path that leads us past scientism, just as the German idealists cleared a path that led us around empiricism. The anti-empiricist lesson of German idealism took a long time to learn, and so may the anti-scientistic lesson of analytic philosophy. But someday intellectual historians may be able to see these apparently opposed movements as complementary.”

Reception and criticism
Because of the clarity and humor of his writing style, and his ability to undermine cherished assumptions, Rorty is one of the most widely-read contemporary philosophers. His political and moral philosophies have been under almost constant attack both from some on the Right, who call them relativist and irresponsible, and some on the Left, who believe them to be insufficient frameworks for social justice. The most common criticism is that Rorty's work is self-refuting (see Nagel and Nozick for instance), although such criticisms often play directly into Rorty's theories about arguing within versus arguing outside of a given 'language-game'.

In Daniel Dennett's humorous Philosophical Lexicon, 'Rorty' is defined as 'incorrigible', which is a neat summing up both of Rorty's career and much of the philosophic community's reaction to it.

At Present
Over the past fifteen years Rorty has continued to publish voluminously, including three volumes of philosophical papers; Achieving Our Country, a political manifesto partly based on readings of John Dewey and Walt Whitman in which Rorty defends the idea of a progressive, pragmatic left against what he feels are anti-action positions espoused by the so-called critical left personified by figures like Michel Foucault; and Philosophy and Social Hope, a collection of essays for a general audience.

Having held teaching positions at Wellesley College, Princeton University, and the University of Virginia, Rorty is currently a professor of comparative literature and philosophy at Stanford University. It seems reasonable to believe that the shift from philosophy to literature reflects his later position that philosophy is really itself just a form of literature.